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1 Introduction
Endogenous business fluctuations have been studied with overlapping generations models for
over twenty years. The dynamic properties of exchange economies have been investigated
in the literature initiated by Benhabib and Day (1982) and Grandmont (1985). They have
paid attention to deterministic cycles or chaotic behavior in equilibrium. Azariadis (1981)
and Azariadis and Guesnerie (1986) study sunspot equilibria of exchange economies. For an
overlapping generations economy with a production sector, Farmer (1986), Reichlin (1986),
Benhabib and Laroque (1988), and Rochon and Polemarchakis (2006) derive competitive
equilibrium cycles. Galor (1992) develops a model with two production sectors and makes
clear the conditions for indeterminacy of equilibrium. None of these studies deal with an
overlapping generations economy with credit market imperfections, although credit market
imperfections are important in understanding macroeconomic phenomena.1
Indeed, overlapping generations economies with credit market imperfections have been
studied in an extensive literature.2 Among those, Matsuyama (2007) and Assenza, et al.
(2009) derive endogenous fluctuations in overlapping generations economies with credit mar-
ket imperfections. To the best of our knowledge, however, no studies demonstrate under
what degree of credit market imperfections the growth rates of an overlapping generations
economy are highly volatile. The objective of this paper is to answer this question.
In this paper, we employ the Schumpeterian endogenous growth model developed by
Aghion and Howitt (1992, 1998). Many researchers have studied the relationship between
economic growth and volatility induced by exogenous productivity shocks empirically and
theoretically (e.g., Ramey and Ramey, 1995; Aghion and Banerjee, 2005; Aghion, et al.,
2010). While in investigating the relationship, endogenous growth models have been useful
tools, the AK approach cannot derive a negative correlation between economic growth and
1For finance and growth, see Levine, et al. (2000) and Aghion, et al (2005) and for business cycles and
credit market imperfections, see, for instance, Kiyotaki and Moore (1997). For financial market globalization
and credit market imperfections, see, for instance, Matsuyama (2004).
2See, for instance, Bernanke and Gertler (1989), Galor and Zeira (1993), and Boyd and Smith (1998).
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volatility under a small inter-temporal elasticity of substitution of agents’ utility (Aghion and
Banerjee, 2005), which is consistent with empirical evidence of Ramey and Ramey (1995).
In contrast, the Schumpeterian approach with credit market imperfections derives a negative
correlation between economic growth and volatility under a small inter-temporal elasticity
of substitution. Although we do not assume any exogenous shocks in our model, the existing
literature motivates us to use the Schumpeterian growth model.
In our model, we assume heterogeneous agents within a generation in terms of their pro-
ductivity in creating capital goods for a R&D sector. Usually, it is diﬃcult to construct
a tractable model with credit constraints in a closed economy where interest rates are de-
termined endogenously. By incorporating heterogeneous agents into an economy, we make
the model tractable in handling credit market imperfections. In our model, each agent
can make a deposit in or borrow from an infinitely-lived financial intermediary. If the pro-
ductivity of an agent is greater than a cutoﬀ, he starts an investment project, borrowing
from the financial intermediary up to the limit of a credit constraint. Meanwhile, if the
productivity of an agent is lower than the cutoﬀ, he only deposits a part of his income in
the financial intermediary. Since all of the financial trades are executed via the financial
market, each agent unconsciously makes financial transactions with other agents intra- or
inter-generationally. The cutoﬀ of the agents’ productivity which divides agents into savers
and investors is determined endogenously and fluctuates endogenously for some parameter
values. The growth rate of the economy is a one-to-one function of the cutoﬀ and thus the
growth rates endogenously fluctuate as well.
The main finding is as follows. In early stages of the development of a financial sector
where credit market imperfections are severe, growth rates evolve monotonically. At the
intermediate level of financial development, growth rates exhibit endogenous fluctuations
for some parameter values. However, as the financial sector matures and credit market
imperfections are resolved, fluctuations disappear and the growth rates evolve once again
monotonically.
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This paper proceeds as follows. Section 2 provides a model. In section 3 we study
equilibrium, deriving a function for the growth rate with respect to the cutoﬀ of agents’
productivity. In section 4, we investigate the dynamic properties of the economy. In section
5, we discuss the mechanism with which endogenous fluctuations arise in equilibrium and in
section 6, we provide numerical examples and observe that it is when the degree of financial
development is at the intermediate level that the growth rates endogenously fluctuate. We
provide concluding remarks in section 7.
2 Model
The economy consists of overlapping generations: young and old agents. Time goes from 0
to ∞. Each agent lives for two periods. The rate of population growth is assumed to be
n > −1, namely Lt+1 = (1 + n)Lt where Lt is the population of young agents at time t.
Young agents can borrow up to a certain limit from an infinitely-lived financial intermediary.
In other words, the financial intermediary imposes credit constraints on young agents.
2.1 Debt and Credit
Young agents can deposit a part of their income in the financial intermediary. Those deposits
become financial resources for the financial intermediary to loan. Meanwhile, each young
agent can borrow against his future income by selling bonds to the financial intermediary.
Young agents can consume, or invest in a project, more than their income in the first period
by going into debt to the financial intermediary.
If the total stock of deposits made by young agents is greater than the total stock of loans
lent to them, this is the case in which the financial intermediary is indebted to the private
sector (the debt case). On the other hand, if the total stock of deposits made by young
agents is less than the total stock of loans lent to them, this is the case in which the private
sector is indebted to the financial intermediary. In this case, the financial intermediary owns
a stock of loans to the private sector (the credit case).
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A loan made by the financial intermediary is an exchange of real output in this period
for real output in the next period. The debt of the financial intermediary at time t, Bt, is
equal to the total deposit minus the total loan in the economy at time t. So in the debt
case, it holds that Bt > 0, whereas in the credit case, it follows that Bt < 0. From a point of
view of a balance sheet of the financial intermediary, Bt < 0 reflects the equity capital of the
financial intermediary. By contrast, Bt > 0 reflects the national debt. The law of motion of
the total debt of the financial intermediary is given by:
Bt+1 = rt+1Bt, (1)
where rt+1 is the (real) interest rate at time t+ 1.
As discussed in De La Croix and Michel (2002, Chapter 4, pp.212), B0 is a predetermined
variable since we do not incorporate nominal money into this economy. At time zero, the
financial intermediary can be a net creditor or a net debtor to the private sector. The initial
amount of credit or debt is determined historically.
2.1.1 Individuals
Each agent is born with one unit of endowments which we call labor. In the first period
of his lifetime, he supplies labor inelastically and earns a wage income. An agent born at
time t consumes c1t when young and c2t+1 when old. There are two saving methods for each
agent. One is depositing his income in the financial intermediary. If an agent deposits one
unit of his income in the financial intermediary at time t, he will gain a claim to rt+1 units
of consumption goods at time t+ 1.
Alternatively, an agent can start an investment project, which will produce capital goods.
The capital goods are thought of broadly as human capital or physical capital and they are
used as input goods for an R&D sector.
In the first period, each agent consumes, starts an investment project, deposits his income
in the financial intermediary, and/or borrows from it. In the second period, he consumes
all his earnings from the investments and from the deposits, and he repays the financial
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intermediary if he borrowed in the first period.
Each agent maximizes his lifetime utility:
u(c1t, c2t+1) (2)
which is a function of consumption (c1t, c2t+1) in youth and old age, subject to:
c1t + kt + bt ≤ wt (3)
zt+1 = φkt (4)
c2t+1 ≤ qt+1zt+1 + rt+1bt, (5)
bt ≥ −μkt, 0 ≤ μ < 1 (6)
kt ≥ 0. (7)
Specifically, we assume u(c1t, c2t+1) = c
γ
1tc
1−γ
2t+1 throughout the current model, where 0 < γ <
1. By specifying the utility as a Cobb-Douglas function, we can highlight the eﬀects of credit
market imperfections on the dynamic properties of the economy. If the income eﬀect of the
return to savings is too strong relative to the substitution eﬀect, equilibrium cycles will
appear without credit market imperfections.3 Since we use a Cobb-Douglas utility function,
however, the income and substitution eﬀects are cancelled by each other. Accordingly,
equilibrium cycles will not arise without credit market imperfections. Inequality (3) is a
budget constraint for the first period. kt is investments in a project and bt is a deposit if
positive and is a debt if negative. wt is a wage income at time t. Eq.(4) is a production
function for capital goods. zt+1 is the capital goods produced by the agent, and φ > 0 is the
productivity of the production. Inequality (5) is a budget constraint for the second period.
qt+1 is the (real) price of the capital goods in terms of the consumption goods at time t+ 1.
Again, rt+1 is the (real) interest rate at time t + 1. Inequality (6) is a credit constraint
which the agent faces. This type of credit constraints is often imposed in the literature.4
3See for instance Grandmont (1985).
4See Aghion, et al. (1999), Aghion and Banerjee (2005) and Aghion et al. (2005). The credit constraint
given by inequality (6) is equivalent to the wealth-backed lending by the financial intermediary. In particular,
even if we replace inequality (6) with bt ≥ −νwt, ν ∈ [0,∞), the results of this paper do not change.
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In appendix, we provide a microfoundation for the credit constraint following Aghion and
Banerjee (2005). While the agent can deposit his income in the financial intermediary as
much as he wants to, he can borrow from it only up to some proportion of the investments.
μ measures the degree of financial development: if μ is large, the financial sector is fully
developed, whereas if μ is small, it is poorly developed. Inequality (7) is a non-negativity
constraint for the investment project.
2.1.2 Heterogeneous Agents
Now the heterogeneity of agents is introduced in terms of their productivity in producing
capital goods. When an agent is born, he receives a shock for his productivity level φ from a
time-invariant distribution G(φ) whose support is [0, a], where a > 0. G(φ) has a continuous
density g(φ) on [0, a].
We assume that each agent knows his own productivity at his birth, while other agents do
not know his productivity.5 In the Diamond type overlapping generations model (Diamond
1965), agents are homogeneous, i.e., φ = 1 for every agent. By contrast, in our model, the
agents’ saving technology depends upon their heterogeneous productivity. As we solve a
consumer’s problem in what follows, we shall find that the heterogeneity of agents is crucial
when savers and investors are endogenously determined.
To solve the utility maximization problem for a consumer, we let st := kt + bt. Since
kt ≥ 0 and bt ≥ −μkt, it follows that st ≥ (1 − μ)kt ≥ 0. Hence, we can rewrite an agent’s
maximization problem as follows:
max
0≤kt≤ st1−μ
u(wt − st, rt+1st + (qt+1φ− rt+1)kt). (8)
In this maximization problem, st > 0 holds because limc2t+1→0 u2(., .) =∞. Since u2(., .) > 0,
if rt+1 > qt+1φ, then it is optimal for the agent to choose kt = 0 and st = bt. Since we
have assumed u(c1t, c2t+1) = c
γ
1tc
1−γ
2t+1, the first-order condition with respect to st is given
by: −γ u(c1t,c2t+1)
c1t
+ (1 − γ)rt+1 u(c1t,c2t+1)c2t+1 = 0 ⇐⇒ c2t+1 = (1−γ)rt+1γ c1t. From this equation,
5Hence, less capable agents cannot ask more capable agents to produce capital goods. For this situation,
one could imagine that less capable agents face prohibitively high costs to identify more capable agents.
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inequality (3) and inequality (5), we obtain bt = (1−γ)wt. On the other hand, if rt+1 < qt+1φ,
then the agent chooses kt =
st
1−μ . The first-order condition is then given by: −γ u(c1t,c2t+1)c1t +
(1 − γ) qt+1φ−rt+1μ
1−μ
u(c1t,c2t+1)
c2t+1
= 0 ⇐⇒ c2t+1 = 1−γγ
qt+1φ−rt+1μ
1−μ c1t. Now from this equation,
inequality (3) and inequality (5), we obtain kt =
(1−γ)wt
1−μ and bt = −
μ(1−γ)wt
1−μ .
φ is used for the index of the heterogeneity of agents. Therefore, we henceforth put it on
each variable as c1t(φ), etc. Lemma 1 summarizes the above results.
Lemma 1 Let φt := rt+1qt+1 . Then, the following claims hold.
• If φt > φ, then kt(φ) = 0 and bt(φ) = (1− γ)wt.
• If φt < φ, then kt(φ) = (1−γ)wt1−μ and bt(φ) = −μ(1−γ)wt1−μ .
Proof : The claims have been proven in the above discussion. ¤
As seen in lemma 1, φt is a cutoﬀ, i.e., if an agent’s productivity is greater than φt, he
starts an investment project, borrowing from the financial intermediary. In this case, the
returns to his savings are subject to his productivity. He obtains more returns from the
investment in a project than from a deposit in the financial intermediary. On the other
hand, if an agent’s productivity is less than φt, he only deposits a part of his income in the
financial intermediary. He prefers to deposit in the financial intermediary rather than to
invest in a project. We can ignore agents with φ = φt because they have no impact on the
economy. As the parameter for financial development μ gets greater, both investments and
borrowings of the agents with φ > φt become large.
2.2 Final Production Sector
The general goods are produced in a final production sector, which become consumption
goods and investment goods. The general goods are produced from a continuum of inter-
mediate goods, which is distributed uniformly in [0, 1]. The production function is given
by:
Yt =
"Z
i∈[0,1]
(Aitxit)
αdi
# 1
α
, (9)
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where Ait is the quality of the ith intermediate good, xit is its quantity, and
1
1−α is the
elasticity of substitution between input goods, which is greater than one since α ∈ (0, 1).
The final production sector is competitive and the representative firm solves the maxi-
mization problem given by:
max
xit
Yt −
Z
i∈[0,1]
p˜itxitdi, (10)
where p˜it is the price of the intermediate good i. From the first-order condition, we have an
inverse demand function for the intermediate good i:
p˜it = A
α
itx
α−1
it Y
1−α
t . (11)
2.3 Intermediate Sector
The intermediate sector consists of a continuum of firms, which is distributed uniformly in
[0, 1]. This distribution is time-invariant because for the intermediate sector, new innova-
tors come out into the market at each period. Due to the newly invented technologies, new
innovators make monopolistic profits. The newly invented technologies may be protected
by patents or it may take time for the technologies to be imitated. The monopolistic prof-
its, however, will disappear in one period since the next newly invented technologies are
introduced into the market by other innovators after one period goes by.6
The intermediate goods are produced from labor with a one-for-one technology, i.e., an
intermediate firm needs one unit of labor to produce one unit of xit. The maximization
problem for an intermediate firm is given by:
max
xit
p˜itxit − wtxit
= max
xit
AαitxαitY 1−αt − wtxit, (12)
where wt is the wage rate. From the first-order condition, we obtain:
wt = αAαitxα−1it Y 1−αt , (13)
6The profits gained by the newly invented technologies are greater than those by the old technologies.
Therefore, the newly invented technologies are always adopted rather than the old ones.
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and
πit = (1− α)AαitxαitY 1−αt , (14)
where πit is a profit. From Eq.(11) and Eq.(13), we note that p˜it = wtα . The prices of all the
intermediate goods are the same in each period.
An intermediate firm supplies the intermediate good with up-to-date quality, which is
developed in an R&D department within the firm.7 The quality of the intermediate goods
is improved by the R&D activities. Ha and Howitt (2007) empirically examine a production
function for the quality improvement of intermediate goods. Using the data for the USA, the
UK, France, Germany, and Japan, they study which model is most suitable to reality: the
first generation endogenous models, the semi-endogenous models, or the fully-endogenous
models with product proliferation.8 They conclude that a functional form which is used
in the fully-endogenous models with product proliferation such as Howitt’s (1999) model is
most plausible. Following them, we assume a functional form for the quality improvement
as follows:
Ait+1 − Ait
Ait
= η
³ zit+1
AitLt
´σ
, (15)
where we assume that 0 < σ ≤ 1.9 η is a productivity parameter of the R&D department,
zit+1 is the capital goods for the R&D activities, and Lt is the population of young agents
at time t. Following Jones’ (1995) critique, scale eﬀects are adjusted in the right-hand side
of Eq.(15). First, we obtain the quality-adjusted input goods to eliminate a scale eﬀect
associated with the current thechnology level, Ait, by dividing zit+1 by Ait. Second, we
divide zit+1/Ait by Lt in order to exclude a scale eﬀect which comes from the increasing
7As discussed in Aghion and Howitt (1992), we may assume that separate firms are engaged in the R&D
activities. In this case, the firms in an R&D sector sell their newly invented technologies to the firms in an
intermediate sector. No results will change with this alternative assumption.
8For details, see Ha and Howitt (2007).
9Even though we alternatively assume a functional form for the quality improvement such as Ait+1/Ait =
η(zit+1/AitLt)σ, our results are unchanged. Or we may allow technology transfers from abroad, by replacing
Eq.(15) with an equation which expresses the rate of technology adoption as in Aghion, et al. (2005) and
Howitt and Mayer-Foulkes (2005).
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number of individuals. Finally, the quality improvement exhibits non-increasing returns to
scale with respect to the input goods, i.e., 0 < σ ≤ 1.
Since each R&D department is in the patent race, the demands for capital goods are
determined by the research-arbitrage condition:
πit+1 = qt+1zit+1,
where again qt+1 is the (real) price of capital goods. Using Eq.(14), we rewrite this equation
as:
(1− α)Aαit+1xαit+1Y 1−αt+1 = qt+1zit+1. (16)
3 Equilibrium
3.1 Growth Rate
The heterogeneity of the intermediate firms is assumed away: all the intermediate firms are
symmetrical. From the labor market clearing condition, we have
R
i∈[0,1] xitdi = Lt. Since
due to the symmetry, the same amount of labor is used in each intermediate firm, xt = Lt
holds. Each R&D division uses the same amount of input goods as well. Let this amount
be z˜t. Then, z˜t :=
R
i∈[0,1] zitdi holds. Hereafter, all variables are independent of i. From the
assumption of symmetry and Eqs.(9), (13), and (16), we have the following equations:
Yt = AtLt
wtLt = αAtLt = αYt
qtz˜t = (1− α)AtLt = (1− α)Yt.
We note that Yt = wtLt+ qtz˜t holds, namely the final output is distributed to the wages and
the returns to the investments.
From lemma 1 and wt = αAt, the market clearing condition (of the R&D sector) is given
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by:
z˜t+1 =
Z a
φt
(1− γ)wt
1− μ LtφdG(φ)
⇐⇒ z˜t+1 =
(1− γ)αAtLt
1− μ F (φt), (17)
where F (φt) = R aφt φdG(φ). As seen in the right-hand side of Eq.(17), input goods for the
R&D sector are supplied by the talented agents.
Substituting Eq.(17) into Eq.(15), we can derive a growth rate (which is defined by the
growth rate of per capita output) as follows:10
Γ(φt) :=
³At+1
At
´
−1
= η
³(1− γ)α
1− μ F (φt)
´σ
. (18)
We note that the direct eﬀect of μ on the growth rate is positive, i.e., for a given φt, as μ
increases the growth rate goes up. We also note that the growth rate is a decreasing function
with respect to φt. As φt increases, the number of investors decreases. Accordingly, for a
given μ, the total investments go down and thus the growth rate decreases.
The above discussion about the eﬀect of μ captures only the direct eﬀect on the growth
rate. However, a change in μ will aﬀect the value of φt indirectly, which is thought of as a
general equilibrium eﬀect. In particular, as we will see, μ has a positive eﬀect on φt in the
steady states. Therefore, at this point, if an economy is in a steady state, we are uncertain
whether μ has a positive or negative eﬀect on the growth rate because the growth rate is
decreasing with φt. In the analysis of the steady state below, we will discuss the eﬀect of μ
on the growth rate, taking into account the indirect eﬀect.
10Again, due to symmetry, Eq.(15) is independent of i.
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3.2 Dynamics
Bt is the net total asset held by young agents at time t, i.e., Bt is the debt at time t, which
is equal to the total deposit minus the total loan. From lemma 1 and wt = αAt, we obtain:
Bt =
Z φt
0
(1− γ)αAtLtdG(φ)
−
Z a
φt
μ(1− γ)αAtLt
1− μ dG(φ)
=
(1− γ)αYt
1− μ [G(φt)− μ]. (19)
We note that the total loan
R a
φt
μ(1−γ)αAtLt
1−μ dG(φ) is aﬀected by the degree of financial de-
velopment μ. Since qt+1z˜t+1 = (1 − α)Yt+1, substituting Eq.(17) into this yields qt+1 =
(1−α)(1−μ)Yt+1
(1−γ)αF (φt)Yt . Therefore, rt+1 = qt+1φt = (1−α)(1−μ)φtYt+1(1−γ)αF (φt)Yt . Substituting the last and Eq.(19)
into Eq.(1), we have:
(1− γ)αYt+1
1− μ [G(φt+1)− μ]| {z }
Bt+1
=
(1− α)(1− μ)φt
(1− γ)αF (φt)
Yt+1
Yt| {z }
rt+1
(1− γ)αYt
1− μ [G(φt)− μ]| {z }
Bt
, (20)
which reduces to a diﬀerence equation of the cutoﬀ, φt:
G(φt+1) = (1− α)(1− μ)α(1− γ)
φt(G(φt)− μ)
F (φt) + μ. (21)
Let us define a function as follows:
Ψ(φ) := (1− α)(1− μ)α(1− γ)
φ(G(φ)− μ)
F (φ) + μ.
We note that the diﬀerence equation Eq.(21) is independent of η , σ, the population growth
n, and the quality of input goods, At. The growth rate Γ(φt) is a one-to-one, continuous
function of φt ∈ [0, a]. Therefore, the dynamic properties of the growth rates are deduced
directly from those of the cutoﬀ. In what follows, we shift our focus to the study of the
dynamic properties of the cutoﬀ.
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3.3 Steady-State Analysis
3.3.1 Two Steady-State Equilibria
A steady-state equilibrium φt = φ¯ solves the following equation:
G(φ¯) = (1− α)(1− μ)α(1− γ)
φ¯(G(φ¯)− μ)
F (φ¯) + μ. (22)
We note that there exist two steady-state equilibria, φ¯ = φ∗ and φ¯ = φ∗∗, unless they are
repeated values, such that:
G(φ∗) = μ (23)
and
φ∗∗
F (φ∗∗) =
α(1− γ)
(1− α)(1− μ) , (24)
respectively.
In the steady-state equilibrium with φ¯ = φ∗, a generation’s net credit position is always
zero, whereas in the steady-state equilibrium with φ¯ = φ∗∗, the net credit position is positive
or negative. We call equilibria with φ¯ = φ∗ and with φ¯ = φ∗∗ a non-trade steady-state
equilibrium and a trade steady-state equilibrium, respectively. Whether a steady-state equi-
librium is called a non-trade or a trade steady-state equilibrium, agents within a generation
make financial trades via the financial intermediary. In the non-trade steady state, the credit
market clears within a generation, whereas in the trade steady state, agents make financial
trades inter-generationally and the credit market clears over two generations. In this sense,
by “non-trade” we mean that agents in a generation do not trade with the agents in the
other generation.
3.3.2 Comparative Statics with respect to μ
Now we investigate the eﬀect of the change of μ on a growth rate, taking into account a
general equilibrium eﬀect.
Proposition 1 As a financial sector is fully developed, i.e., as μ increases, the following
hold:
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• The growth rate goes up in the non-trade steady state, i.e., ∂Γ(φ∗)∂μ > 0.
• The growth rate goes up in the trade steady state as well, i.e., ∂Γ(φ∗∗)∂μ > 0.
Proof : See appendix.
King and Levine (1993a,b) and Levine, et al. (2000) give empirical evidence for the
positive eﬀect of financial development on economic growth. Our results for the steady states
are consistent with their discoveries. From Eqs.(24) and (25), we note that both φ∗ and φ∗∗
increase as μ goes up. This means that the number of investors decreases, which negatively
aﬀects the growth rate. However, from lemma 1, although there are fewer investors, we note
that each investor borrows and invests more now than before μ went up. This latter positive
eﬀect is stronger than the former negative eﬀect in both steady states. Therefore, the growth
rate always goes up in the steady states.
The model captures well the properties of financial development. As a financial sector
is fully developed, the mis-allocation of production factors is corrected. As μ goes up, less
capable investors turn into savers and the economic resources concentrate on more capable
investors. As a result, eﬃciency in the economy is promoted. Less capable agents can utilize
the ability of more capable agents. This is an essential characteristic of financial deepening.
4 Dynamic Properties
In this section, we investigate the dynamic properties of the economy. As seen in Eq.(18),
Γ(φt) is a one-to-one, continuous function of φt ∈ [0, a]. This means that if the equilibrium
sequence, {φt}∞t=0, exhibits cyclical behavior, then so does the equilibrium sequence of the
growth rates, {Γ(φt)}∞t=0.
We define a compact interval in < as X = [0,max{φ∗,φ∗∗}]. We restrict the domain of
the dynamical system of Eq.(21) to X so as to obtain economically meaningful equilibria.
If {φt}∞t=0 starts with φ0 ∈ (max{φ∗,φ∗∗}, a], then G(φt) becomes greater than one in finite
time. Such a sequence does not become an equilibrium. We assume that the minimum of
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Ψ(φ) (which is the right-hand side of Eq.(21)) is no less than zero. Having restricted the
domain of the system to X , then the map, Ψ : X → X, is continuous and maps X into itself.
Henceforth, we use the pair (X,Ψ) to denote our dynamical system.
We linearize the diﬀerence equation Eq.(21) around a steady state:
φt+1 − φ¯ = Φ(φ¯)(φt − φ¯),
where Φ(φ) = (1−α)(1−μ)φα(1−γ)F (φ)
h³
1
φg(φ) +
φ
F (φ)
´
(G(φ)− μ) + 1
i
.
Eq.(19) can be rewritten as Bt+(1−γ)αAtLtμ(1−G(φt))/(1−μ) = (1−γ)αAtLtG(φt),
where the left-hand side is the debt plus the total loan and the right-hand side is the total
deposit. This equation must hold at each point in time, expressing the credit market clearing
condition, namely the left-hand side is the demand for the financial resources and the right-
hand side is the supply of the financial resources. We should note that B0, A0, and L0
are historically given. Therefore, the initial cutoﬀ φ0 is uniquely determined at time zero,
implying that it is a predetermined variable. This means that the ratio of r1 to q1 is uniquely
determined at time zero as well.
The local stability depends upon whether φ∗∗ is greater than φ∗ or not.
Proposition 2 • If φ∗∗ > φ∗, then the non-trade steady-state equilibrium (φ¯ = φ∗) is
locally stable, whereas the trade steady-state equilibrium (φ¯ = φ∗∗) is locally unstable.
• If φ∗∗ < φ∗, then the non-trade steady-state equilibrium (φ¯ = φ∗) is locally unstable,
whereas the stability of the trade steady-state equilibrium (φ¯ = φ∗∗) is ambiguous.
Proof : If φ∗ < φ∗∗, then |Φ(φ∗)| = | (1−α)(1−μ)φ∗α(1−γ)F (φ∗) | < | (1−α)(1−μ)φ
∗∗
α(1−γ)F (φ∗∗) | = 1 and |Φ(φ∗∗)| =¯¯¯³
1
φ∗∗g(φ∗∗) +
φ∗∗
F (φ∗∗)
´
(G(φ∗∗) − μ) + 1
¯¯¯
> 1. If φ∗ > φ∗∗, then |Φ(φ∗)| = | (1−α)(1−μ)φ∗α(1−γ)F (φ∗) | >
| (1−α)(1−μ)φ∗∗α(1−γ)F (φ∗∗) | = 1. However, we cannot know whether |Φ(φ∗∗)| =
¯¯¯³
1
φ∗∗g(φ∗∗)+
φ∗∗
F (φ∗∗)
´
(G(φ∗∗)−
μ) + 1
¯¯¯
is greater than one or not. ¤
The phase diagrams for each case are given in figures 1-3. As seen in figure 3, if the trade
equilibrium is locally unstable, it is possible for the dynamical system to exhibit cycles.
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Particularly, a flip bifurcation occurs at (φ∗∗, μ˜) where
³
1
φ∗∗g(φ∗∗) +
φ∗∗
F (φ∗∗)
´
(G(φ∗∗)− μ˜)+1 =
−1. Proposition 3 below shows that a (stable or unstable) period-two cycle exists when the
trade steady-state equilibrium is locally unstable.
[Figures 1-4 around here]
Proposition 3 Suppose that φ∗∗ < φ∗. If the trade steady-state equilibrium is locally unsta-
ble, there exists a period-two cycle of {φt}∞t=0 in equilibrium.
Proof : Let Ψ˜(φ) = G−1(Ψ(φ)). Then Eq.(25) is written as φt+1 = Ψ˜(φt). We can take
φ0 close to φ∗ so that Ψ˜2(φ0) < φ0 < φ∗ because Φ(φ∗) > 1. If the trade steady-state
equilibrium is locally unstable, then Φ(φ∗∗) < −1. So we can take φ00 close to φ∗∗ so that
Ψ˜(φ00) < φ∗∗ < φ00 < Ψ˜2(φ00) < Ψ˜2(φ0). Therefore, by continuity, there exists φ¯0 such that
Ψ˜(φ¯0) < φ∗∗ < φ¯0 = Ψ˜2(φ¯0) < φ∗, which means that there exists a period-two cycle. ¤
A graphical analysis gives a proof of proposition 2 as well. Since φ∗∗ < φ∗, if the trade
steady-state equilibrium is locally unstable, Φ(φ∗∗) < −1 holds. The configuration of φt+1 =
G−1(Ψ(φt)) in this case is drawn in figure 4. Its mirror image relative to the 45 degree line
is drawn as well. As seen in the figure, there exists at least one pair of φ¯0 and φ¯1, where
φ¯1 6= φ¯0, such that φ¯1 = G−1(Ψ(φ¯0)) and φ¯0 = G−1(Ψ(φ¯1)).
5 Financial Deepening and Cycles
In the previous section, we have examined the dynamical system analytically and we have
seen the appearance of cycles in equilibrium. In this section, we investigate under what
conditions are endogenous fluctuations more or less likely to arise.
Let us consider the case in which μ = 0. If μ = 0, then φ∗ = 0 holds from Eq.(23). There-
fore, from the first part of proposition 2 and from its phase diagram, {φt}∞t=0 monotonically
converges to φ¯ = φ∗ = 0 whenever {φt}∞t=0 starts with φ0 ∈ [0,φ∗∗). Therefore, cycles do not
arise. By continuity, given other parameters and the distribution function for φ, there exists
17
μ0 such that for μ ∈ [0,μ0] almost all of the sequences {φt}∞t=0 which start with an arbitrary
value of φ0 ∈ X monotonically converge to φ¯ = φ∗ = 0. Meanwhile, if μ is suﬃciently
close to one, the first term of Eq.(21) degenerates and thus wherever {φt}∞t=0 starts in X , it
converges to an asymptotically stable steady state.11 In this case, no cycles appear either.
Again by continuity, we can claim that given other parameters and the distribution function
for φ, there exists μ1 such that for μ ∈ [μ1, 1) almost all of the sequences {φt}∞t=0 with φ0 ∈ X
converge to an asymptotically stable steady state. From these discussions, we note that if a
financial sector is fully developed or poorly developed, endogenous cycles do not appear. It
is when financial development is at an intermediate level that endogenous fluctuations can
arise.
From proposition 2, we note that it is in the credit case that the economy fluctuates.
Essentially, the dynamic properties of {φt}∞t=0 depend upon Bt+1 = rt+1Bt because Eq.(21)
originates in this equation. In it, both rt+1 and Bt are functions of φt. Since rt+1 = φtqt+1 =
(1−α)(1−μ)(1+n)φt
(1−γ)αF (φt) (Γ(φt) + 1) = (1−α)(1−μ)(1+n)φt(1−γ)α
h
η
F (φt)1−σ
¡
(1−γ)α
1−μ
¢σ
+ 1
F (φt)
i
, rt+1 is increasing
with φt. From Eq.(19), Bt is increasing with φt as well. Nevertheless, an increase in φt at the
beginning of period t has an ambiguous eﬀect on φt+1. This is because Bt could be negative.
As we have seen in the previous section, if the trade steady-state equilibrium φ¯ = φ∗∗ is
locally unstable, then the economy exhibits endogenous fluctuations in equilibrium. In what
follows, we will see that it is possible that the economy oscillates when μ is the intermediate
value.
Suppose that the economy is in the trade steady-state equilibrium at the beginning of
time t. In this case, since (1−α)(1−μ)α(1−γ)
φ∗∗
F (φ∗∗) = 1, we obtain the steady-state interest rate as
follows:
r∗∗ = (1 + n)(Γ(φ∗∗) + 1). (25)
We note that if the growth rate is zero, i.e., Γ(φ∗∗) = 0, then the steady-state interest rate
r∗∗ is equal to the biological interest rate of Samuelson (1958), where less capable agents
11However, in this case, we cannot specify to which steady state, φ¯ = φ∗ or φ¯ = φ∗∗, the economy converges.
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receive a net interest rate, n, which is the population growth. On the other hand, from (19)
the debt in the steady state is given by:
B∗∗ =
h
(1− γ)αG(φ∗∗)− μ(1− γ)α
1− μ (1−G(φ
∗∗))
i
Yt, (26)
where Yt is given when we look at B
∗∗ at time t. Since we assume the credit case now,
B∗∗ < 0 holds.
Now suppose that the economy faces a shock so that the prospective interest rate at
time t + 1, rt+1, goes up. In this case, agents whose productivity is slightly greater than
φ∗∗ turn from investors into savers. Therefore, the number of savers increases whereas the
number of investors decreases relative to the case in which the economy is in the trade steady
state. As a result, Bt goes up; however, it is still negative and thus the absolute value of
Bt decreases. If μ is not close to one, i.e., μ is an intermediate value, then from Eq.(26)
the increase in Bt is small relative to the increase in rt+1. In this case, rt+1Bt decreases,
which means that the financial resources of the financial intermediary at time t + 1 go up.
Accordingly, the prospective interest rate at time t + 2, rt+2, goes down. As a result, φt+1
becomes smaller than φ∗∗ and thus the economy oscillates. If the sequence {φt}∞t=0 does not
converge, equilibrium cycles emerge.
From the proof of the second part of proposition 2, it follows that if
³
1
φ∗∗g(φ∗∗)+
φ∗∗
F (φ∗∗)
´
(G(φ∗∗)−
μ) < −2, then the trade steady-state equilibrium is locally unstable. In this case, we note
from the phase diagram that endogenous fluctuations arise. From the assumption of the
second part of proposition 2, we have G(φ∗∗) − μ < 0. Therefore, the condition for cycles
must hold if 1φ∗∗g(φ∗∗) +
φ∗∗
F (φ∗∗) is very big. For instance, whenever the density at φ∗∗ is very
thin, i.e., g(φ∗∗) is very small, this value becomes large. In other words, it is always possible
that endogenous fluctuations arise when the distribution for φ has a thin density at φ∗∗.
6 Numerical Analysis
A growth rate has a one-to-one relationship with a cutoﬀ and thus we have investigated
the dynamic properties of the cutoﬀ. While we have found that it is only when μ is the
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intermediate value that endogenous fluctuations appear, we have not made clear to what
kinds of cycles the economy converges in equilibrium. In this section, in order to investigate
the dynamic properties of the sequences {φt}∞t=0 and {Γ(φt)}∞t=0 numerically, we create bifur-
cation diagrams. These diagrams are helpful for us to understand the asymptotic dynamic
properties of the economy concretely. We assume that φ ∼ U(0, 1). We would like to study
the relationship between the degree of credit constraints and the dynamic properties of the
growth rates. Therefore, we create bifurcation diagrams with respect to μ.
When φ has a uniform distribution U(0, 1), the dynamics of growth rates is given by the
system of two equations:
φt+1 = Ψ(φt) = 2(1− α)(1− μ)α(1− γ)
φt(φt − μ)
1− φ2t + μ
and
Γ(φt) = η
³(1− γ)α
1− μ F (φt)
´σ
.
We create the bifurcation diagrams for the dynamical system iterating 10000 times. In
this numerical analysis, we assume α = 0.65, which implies that the labor share of output
is 65%. We examine the various cases for γ: γ = 0.9192, γ = 0.9210, and γ = 0.9228. In
either case, the saving rate of an agent is around 8%.12 We choose the initial condition to
be φ0 = 0.01.13
[Figures 5-7 around here]
Figures 5-7 give bifurcation diagrams for φt with respect to the degree of financial deep-
ening, i.e., μ. As predicted in the previous section, for all cases, if μ is small or large, {φt}∞t=0
12Nowadays, there are many countries in which the household saving rate is less than 10%.
13We can verify that Ψ : X → X is a (upside-down) unimodal map: the critical point is m := μ
1+
√
1−μ2
. In
this case, it is well known that for a given μ, if a Schwarzian derivative, S(Ψ) := Ψ000(φ)Ψ0(φ) − 32 (Ψ
00(φ)
Ψ0(φ) )
2 < 0 for
all φ ∈ X − {m}, then the asymptotic behavior of almost all sequences {φt}∞t=0 will be the same. Therefore,
the choice of initial conditions does not matter. See for example Guckenheimer and Holmes (1983). Our
Schwarzian derivative is too complicated to investigate its sign analytically. However, we plotted the values
of our Schwarzian derivatives and numerically confirmed that the signs are negative. In addition, to make
sure, we examined various initial values: we found that the asymptotic behavior of the dynamical system is
invariant to the initial condition.
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converges to an asymptotically stable steady state and thus the growth rates converge to a
stationary growth rate as well. For each case, however, if the value of μ is in the intermediate
region, endogenous fluctuations appear. When γ = 0.9192, as μ goes up from zero or goes
down from one, the economy experiences period doubling bifurcations. At the intermediate
values of μ, a globally stable period-eight cycle arises. When γ = 0.9210 and γ = 0.9228,
the economy exhibits a complex dynamics in the intermediate region. For example, when
γ = 0.9228, as μ increases from zero, we observe the first period doubling bifurcation around
μ = 0.298 and the second period doubling bifurcation around μ = 0.393. These bifurcations
are repeated over and over again and eventually the economy enters a complex region (shaded
regions in the diagrams). As seen in figure 6, when γ = 0.9210 similar things happen.
A new finding from these bifurcation diagrams is that the amplitudes of cycles increase
as γ goes up. We note from lemma 1 that as γ increases, agents put more weight on the
first-period consumption and thus the total borrowing in the economy goes up. While the
total borrowing goes up, the investments by each investor go down (lemma 1), which leads
the price of capital goods to climb up. As a result, the cutoﬀ goes down and the number of
investors increases. This means that more agents are subject to the credit constraints when
γ is large than when it is small. Hence, we may say that the enlarged amplitudes of cycles
are due to the credit market imperfections agents are facing.
7 Concluding Remarks
We have investigated the relationship between credit market imperfections and the fluctua-
tions of growth rates. Credit market imperfections have eﬀects on macroeconomic phenom-
ena such as economic growth and business cycles. Our main findings are as follows: (i) if
the development of a financial sector is at an intermediate level, endogenous fluctuations of
growth rates arise for some parameter values and (ii) if a financial sector is fully developed
or poorly developed, the growth rates converge to an asymptotically stable steady state.
We make a final remark for future research. Investigating what would happen if our
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model is extended to a two-country model is future research. This investigation is important
because a propagation mechanism of business cycles between two countries whose degrees of
financial development are diﬀerent is an open question. This is left for future research.
Appendices
i) Microfoundation for credit constraints
We provide a microfoundation for credit constraints. The idea is based on Aghion and
Banerjee (2005).
Each borrower prepares his fund for investment st, where st = (1 − γ)wt because the
Cobb-Douglas utility function is assumed. Accordingly, his total investment resources are
kt = st − bt. The return on one unit of investment is qt+1φ. If a borrower repays his
obligations earnestly, then he earns a net income, qt+1φkt + rt+1bt. However, if the borrower
does not repay his obligations, he incurs a cost, δkt to hide his revenue. In this case, a
financial intermediary monitors the borrower and it will capture him with probability pt+1.
Then, his expected income is given by qt+1φkt − δkt + pt+1rt+1bt.
Under this loan contract, the incentive compatibility constraint which incentivizes the
borrower not to default is given by
qt+1φkt + rt+1bt ≥ [qt+1φ− δ]kt + pt+1rt+1bt, (27)
which is rewritten as
bt ≥ −
δ
rt+1(1− pt+1)
kt, (28)
The left-hand side of Eq.(27) is the revenue which the borrower obtains when he invests in
a project and repays his obligations, and the right-hand side is the gain when he defaults.
Eq.(28) is independent of the return on one unit of investment.
The financial intermediary incurs a cost, btC(pt+1), which is increasing and convex with
respect to pt+1, so that it attains the probability pt+1 to detect the borrower’s deception.
Following Aghion and Banerjee (2005), we assume C(pt+1) = κ log(1 − pt+1), where κ is
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strictly greater than δ so that all borrowers face credit constraints more severe than their
natural debt limits. The financial intermediary will choose an optimal probability to solve a
maximization problem such that
max
pt+1
− pt+1rt+1bt − κ log(1− pt+1)bt.
This maximization problem is rewritten as
max
pt+1
pt+1rt+1 + κ log(1− pt+1).
From the first-order condition, we have
rt+1 =
κ
1− pt+1
. (29)
From Eqs.(28) and (29), we obtain
bt ≥ −
δ
κkt. (30)
As long as it imposes a credit constraint given by inequality (30) on all agents, no
borrowers will default in equilibrium. Since δ < κ, we can let μ := δκ ∈ [0, 1), and thus
bt ≥ −μkt,
which is a credit constraint in the main text. δ and κ are associated with a default cost
and a monitoring cost, respectively. Therefore, μ can be regarded as a measure of financial
sector development.
ii) Proof of proposition 1
We take four steps to show proposition 1.
Step 1 : If φ¯ ∈ [0, a), then F (φ¯) > φ¯(1 − G(φ¯)), since F (φ¯) = R aφ¯ φdG(φ) > R aφ¯ φ¯dG(φ) =
φ¯(1−G(φ¯)).
Step 2 : ∂φ
∗
∂μ =
1
g(φ∗) , which follows from G(φ∗) = μ.
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Step 3 : F (φ∗∗) − (1 − μ)φ∗∗g(φ∗∗)∂φ∗∗∂μ = (1 − μ)F (φ
∗∗)
φ∗∗
∂φ∗∗
∂μ . This is because from
φ∗∗
F (φ∗∗) =
α(1−γ)
(1−α)(1−μ) , we have:
log φ∗∗ − logF (φ∗∗) = log
hα(1− γ)
(1− α)
i
− log(1− μ).
Therefore, we have:
h 1
φ∗∗ +
φ∗∗g(φ∗∗)
F (φ∗∗)
i∂φ∗∗
∂μ =
1
1− μ (31)
⇐⇒ F (φ∗∗)− (1− μ)φ∗∗g(φ∗∗)∂φ
∗∗
∂μ = (1− μ)
F (φ∗∗)
φ∗∗
∂φ∗∗
∂μ .
Step 4 : Case 1: φ¯ = φ∗. From step 1, it holds that:
φ∗
F (φ∗) <
1
1−G(φ∗) =
1
1− μ . (32)
From step 2 and Eq.(32), we have:
−φ∗(1− μ) + F (φ∗)
(1− μ)2 > 0
⇐⇒
−φ∗g(φ∗)(1− μ) 1
g(φ∗) + F (φ∗)
(1− μ)2 > 0
⇐⇒
−φ∗g(φ∗)(1− μ)∂φ∗∂μ + F (φ∗)
(1− μ)2 > 0
⇐⇒ ∂∂μ
hF (φ∗)
1− μ
i
> 0
⇐⇒ ∂Γ(φ
∗)
∂μ > 0.
Case 2: φ¯ = φ∗∗. From Eq.(31), ∂φ∗∗∂μ > 0 holds. Then, from step 3, we have:
(1− μ)F (φ∗∗)φ∗∗ ∂φ
∗∗
∂μ
(1− μ)2 > 0
⇐⇒
−φ∗∗g(φ∗∗)(1− μ)∂φ∗∗∂μ + F (φ∗∗)
(1− μ)2 > 0
⇐⇒ ∂∂μ
hF (φ∗∗)
1− μ
i
> 0
⇐⇒ ∂Γ(φ
∗∗)
∂μ > 0. ¤
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Figure 2: φ∗∗ < φ∗, No Cycles
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Figure 4: Period-Two Cycle
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Figure 5: Bifurcation Diagram for phi, Gamma=0.9192
Figure 6: Bifurcation Diagram for phi, Gamma=0.9210
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Figure 7: Bifurcation Diagram for phi, Gamma=0.9228
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